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ABSTRACT
The AS topology incompleteness problem is derived from 
difficulties in the discovery of p2p links, and is amplified 
by the increasing popularity of Internet eXchange Points 
(IXPs) to support peering interconnection. We describe, 
implement, and validate a method for discovering currently 
invisible IXP peering links by mining BGP communities 
used by IXP route servers to implement multilateral peering 
(MLP), including communities that signal the intent to re-
strict announcements to a subset of participants at a given 
IXP. Using route server data juxtaposed with a mapping of 
BGP community values, we can infer 206K p2p links from 
13 large European IXPs, four times more p2p links than 
what is directly observable in public BGP data. The ad-
vantages of the proposed technique are threefold. First, it 
utilizes existing BGP data sources and does not require the 
deployment of additional vantage points nor the acquisition 
of private data. Second, it requires only a few active queries, 
facilitating repeatability of the measurements. Finally, it of-
fers a new source of data regarding the dense establishment 
of MLP at IXPs.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.5 [Local and Wide-Area Networks]: Internet; C.2.1 
[Network Architecture and Design]: Network topology
Keywords
AS relationships; routing policies; multilateral peering; IXP; 
BGP; topology
1. INTRODUCTION
The Internet inter-domain routing infrastructure is com-
posed of self-organized Autonomous Systems (ASes), which 
connect to each other using the Border Gateway Protocol 
(BGP). The BGP-induced AS topology has important impli-
cations on the performance, security, and quality-of-service 
of protocols and applications, and has therefore attracted
significant research interest from a variety of disciplines.
Many findings have been characterized as controversial due
to the widely documented incompleteness of the existing
AS topology datasets [22, 31, 23, 35, 21, 33]. The most
widely-used data sources for compiling the AS graph use
BGP and/or traceroute data. The incompleteness problem
derives from the inability of these data sources to observe
most p2p links due to policy restrictions imposed by oper-
ators that limit propagation of p2p links. The proliferation
of Internet eXchange Points (IXPs) to support cost-effective
dense peering amplifies the gap between what exists and
what can be observed. Researchers have proposed a number
of methods to find missing p2p links, such as more effective
placement of vantage points [44, 39, 27], aggressive deploy-
ment of traceroute monitors at edges of the network [21, 38,
37], or combining different data sources including Internet
Routing Registries (IRRs) and looking glass servers [19, 42,
28, 15]. In 2012, Ager et al. used sampled traffic (sFlow)
data from a large European IXP to discover more peering
links at this single IXP than were previously believed to
exist in the whole Internet [14].
In this paper we describe, implement, and validate a new
method to reveal currently invisible AS peerings using pub-
licly available BGP data sources. Our approach infers peer-
ings established over IXP-provided route servers. Most ASes
at an IXP use a route server to implement multilateral peer-
ing (MLP) and maximize their peering. MLP is the preva-
lent peering paradigm in terms of number of p2p links [41,
20], therefore unearthing those links is a critical step to-
wards more complete AS topologies. The default behavior
of route servers is to advertise all the routes they learn to
all connected peers, though many IXPs allow their members
to control how their prefixes are advertised by using a set
of special-purpose BGP community values. We implement
an algorithm to mine these community values, extract the
route server participants, and infer their export policies. By
combining BGP data from multiple sources we infer more
than 206K p2p links from 13 IXPs for May 2013, 88% of
which are not visible in publicly available BGP AS paths.
This paper significantly extends our preliminary work,
in which we used IXP route servers and BGP community
strings to infer 36K peering links [26]. In this work we de-
velop additional more efficient methods using public looking
glasses, which enable us to infer 206K peering links – 5.7
times more than in [26] – at mostly the same set of IXPs.
We validate 26K of these links using 70 publicly available
looking glasses, finding at least 98.4% exist. In particular,
our new methods find most of the peering at DE-CIX: 54K
links up from 7K in our previous work. This IXP had more
than 50K links in 2011 [14]. The peering we do not find
is established bilaterally across the IXP peering fabric; we
claim this is a small fraction of the peering at our IXPs be-
cause our result for DE-CIX is comparable to that in [14],
and the ASes that engage in bilateral peering are more likely
to be selective or restrictive in their peering decisions, i.e.
peer with a small fraction of members at an IXP. We also
analyze revealing topological characteristics of the discov-
ered links. Notably, 25K (12.4%) of the links are between
two stub ASes, making them impossible to observe via BGP
unless a vantage point is present in one. Similarly, 114K in
our set (55.6%) involve at least one stub, reinforcing Ager’s
reports of dense peering connectivity at the edge [14]. We
show that while some ASes publicly advertise a restrictive
or selective peering policy, they engage in dense multilateral
peering in selected geographical regions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We be-
gin with an overview of AS topology data sources and their
incompleteness. In section 3 we describe how MLP is im-
plemented using route servers and how individual ASes can
control which other ASes receive their routes. Section 4
presents our inference algorithm and how we apply it to mul-
tiple BGP data sources: BGP data archived by Route Views
and RIPE RIS, as well as active queries of looking glasses
located at the IXP or clustered close to it. In Section 5
we present our results, demonstrating that 88% of the links
we infer were previously invisible, and that at least 98.1%
are valid. Section 6 suggests some auspicious next steps for
improving our understanding of the Internet topology.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1 Inter-domain Routing
A network of routers under the same administrative en-
tity is called an Autonomous System (AS) and comprises a
routing domain. Each AS is identified by a unique 32-bit
number (ASN). ASes are autonomous in the sense that they
can independently decide which Interior Gateway Protocol
(IGP) will be used for routing inside their own domains. To
achieve global reachability ASes interconnect and exchange
prefix reachability information using the inter-domain rout-
ing protocol known as Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). In
inter-domain routing, physical connectivity does not imply
reachability, which is fundamentally determined by routing
policies specified by AS operators, which depend largely on
business relationships between ASes.
Business relationships define the economics of routing be-
tween ASes and are coarsely divided into three categories. A
customer-to-provider (c2p) relationship is established when
an AS (customer) pays a better-connected AS (provider) to
transit traffic to the rest of the Internet. A peer-to-peer
(p2p) relationship is when two ASes agree to exchange traf-
fic only between themselves and their customers to minimize
the costs of sending traffic through their providers. Finally,
a sibling relationship expresses a connection between ASes
owned by the same organization, which freely exchanges
traffic without cost or routing restrictions.
BGP routes are usually exported following the valley-free
rule [24], i.e. a customer route can be exported to any neigh-
bor, but a route from a peer or a provider can only be ex-
ported to customers. Hence, a path (a series of adjacent
AS links) is valley-free if it complies with one of the follow-
ing patterns (the sibling links can be found in any position
of the path without changing the valley-free property): (1)
n×c2p + m×p2c; or (2) n×c2p + p2p + m×p2c; where n
and m ≥ 0. Most routing paths are valley-free because they
follow from the business interests of ASes, i.e. to minimize
operation cost and maximize revenue, although exceptions
exist [25].
2.2 AS Topology Data Sources
BGP data is the most widely used source of AS topol-
ogy data. Route collectors operated by Route Views [12]
and RIPE RIS [10] passively collect BGP messages and pro-
vide public archives of routing tables and update messages.
Routing tables and update messages include an AS Path
attribute which identifies the sequence of ASes visited be-
fore the route was received, also known as the control path.
The AS path is the primary source of AS links and is gener-
ally considered a reliable source. However, misconfiguration,
route hijacks, and path poisoning may induce false links [33,
36]. Other sources of BGP data include Looking Glass (LG)
servers that allow the remote execution of non-privileged
BGP commands through a web interface or remote login.
In the general case LG servers do not allow full BGP table
dumps, and typically they are used in one-off queries and not
periodic data collection due to the high cost of performing
prefix-specific queries.
A second popular source of topology information is IP-
level paths collected through globally distributed traceroute
monitors. AS links can be inferred by mapping the col-
lected IP addresses to ASNs. However, such mapping is
a heuristic and can produce considerable artifacts arising
from IP addresses returned by routers in paths that map to
a third-party ASes [43]. A third source is the Internet Rout-
ing Registry (IRR), a publicly accessible database where AS
administrators voluntarily and manually register adjacency
and policy information. IRR data are frequently inaccurate,
incomplete or intentionally false, although certain databases
- notably RIPE - are more reliable. It has been shown that
with the proper filtering techniques the IRR can provide a
useful source of topology data [40, 16]. Other topology data
sources exist, e.g. syslogs, but they are usually proprietary
and not available to the research community.
2.3 The Topology Incompleteness Problem
The most significant limitation of the existing BGP data
collection projects is the large number of missing links. Miss-
ing links are of two types: hidden and invisible [34]. Hidden
links are usually backup c2p links that can be observed if
the preferred path towards a prefix changes. Other (typi-
cally p2p) links are inherently invisible links due to the lim-
ited number and placement of vantage points, and the route
propagation restrictions on p2p relationships associated with
valley-free routing policies of most ISPs. Invisible p2p links
constitute the majority of missing links, and are mostly lo-
cated in the periphery of the AS graph [35, 33]. BGP feeds
are mostly provided by high-tier ASes and some geographic
areas are poorly covered. Furthermore, two-thirds of all con-
tributing ASes configure their connection with the BGP col-
lector as a p2p link, which means they advertise only routes
learned from customers. AS paths collected from LG servers
suffer from similar limitations [30]. Theoretically optimal
placement of BGP monitors might mitigate this incomplete-
ness [44, 39, 27], but in practice ASes participate voluntar-
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Figure 1: Bilateral (a) vs Multilateral (b) peering
for a full-mesh connection between six ASes. Bilat-
eral peering requires n ·(n−1)/2 BGP sessions, while
multilateral peering requires only c · n sessions with
c route servers.
ily in such data collection projects so optimal placement is
not possible. Some researchers suggest highly distributed
traceroute monitoring infrastructures [38, 21] are a promis-
ing approach to discover invisible AS links, yet the visibility
improvement so far is limited compared with the links dis-
covered at just a single IXP by Ager et al. [14].
Another increasingly prominent aspect of the Internet in-
terconnection ecosystem is the proliferation of IXP infras-
tructure to facilitate cost-effective dense peering. Recent
work [28, 15] has demonstrated a vast number of p2p links
at IXPs, most of which were not visible in any public data
set. This hypothesis has been confirmed by an Internet-wide
traceroute study that targeted the discovery of IXP peer-
ings [15]. In total, 58K IXP links were inferred, of which 44K
were not visible in any public dataset. Despite the novelty of
these techniques [15, 28] they have not been used to provide
periodic data due to the complexities of data acquisition.
Conducting large-scale targeted traceroute measurements is
computationally expensive as well as time-consuming; the
methodology in [15] required 16 million traceroute and LG
queries (14 days to complete) to discover 44K links.
Recently, Ager et al. [14] used sFlow traffic data to dis-
cover a rich peering fabric at a large European IXP. Based
on actual traffic exchanged they inferred more than 50K p2p
links at this IXP alone, about 10K more than was visible in
public BGP data for the same period, and more than that
discovered across all IXPs using traceroute in [15].
3. MULTILATERAL PEERING
An increasing number of IXPs offer two interconnection
paradigms, bilateral and multilateral peering, both of which
are illustrated in figure 1. Bilateral agreements require es-
tablishing a new BGP session for every peering, which scales
poorly at IXPs that mostly have participants with open
peering policies who wish to maximize their peering. For
IXPs with more than 50K reported peerings [14], managing
a separate BGP session for each peer would involve consid-
erable overhead. MLP offers a scalable way to support such
dense peering; participants connect with one or more route
servers which reflect routes learned from one participant to
other participants. Further, some ASes will not enter into
bilateral peering unless traffic requirements are met, but will
advertise routes to a route server so that smaller ASes can
reach them directly. The most notable example is Google,
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Figure 2: Controlling route advertisements in a
route server using BGP communities. In (a), X ad-
vertises a route to two selected peers, while in (b)
X advertises to all peers except two.
DE-CIX MSK-IX ECIX
RS-ASN 6695 8631 9033
ALL 6695:6695 8631:8631 9033:9033
EXCLUDE 0:peer-asn 0:peer-asn 64960:peer-asn
NONE 0:6695 0:8631 65000:0
INCLUDE 6695:peer-asn 8631:peer-asn 65000:peer-asn
Table 1: Examples of patterns of community
values for controlling announcements by a route
server. Typically, members use ALL+EXCLUDE
or NONE+INCLUDE to control announcements.
whose peering policy requires at least 100Mbps peak traffic
to establish bilateral peering; they invite networks with less
than 100Mbps traffic to peer with them via route servers [6].
Although connection to route servers is optional, a large per-
centage of IXPs’ members opt in. For example, about 77%
of the members of the two largest IXPs (DE-CIX and AMS-
IX) are connected to the route servers. For the rest of this
paper we will use the term RS members to refer to route
server members.
By default, routes sent to a route server are advertised to
all RS members. However, members can control which net-
works receive their routes through the route server. Filtering
mechanisms are essential for IXP participants because even
ASes with very open routing policy may not wish to peer
with everybody at a given IXP. There are several techniques
to implement policy filters, but the most popular practice
is through the use of BGP communities, an optional 32-bit
BGP attribute used to encode additional information on a
BGP route [29]. The values of BGP communities are not
standardized, but IXPs clearly document the usage of their
community values in IRR records or support pages. There
are four common community types among all the IXPs we
studied that define the following actions:
• ALL: routes are announce to all RS members. This is
the default behavior.
• EXCLUDE: block an announcement toward a specific
member. This action can be used in combination with
the ALL community to exclude specific RS members
from receiving a route.
• NONE: Block an announcement toward all RS mem-
bers. When a community type signals this action, no
member receives the route unless they are listed with
an INCLUDE community.
• INCLUDE: Allow an announcement toward a specific
member. This action can be used in combination with
the NONE community to allow only specific RS mem-
bers to receive a route.
Table 1 shows some examples of community values for dif-
ferent IXPs. The peer-asn corresponds to the ASN of the
RS member that will be included or excluded from receiving
an advertisement. In this paper we label route server com-
munity values RS communities. Because the peer-asn part
of a community value is 16 bits wide, it is not possible to
directly encode 32-bit ASNs. Many IXP operators map the
32-bit ASNs of their members to 16-bit ASNs in the private
ASN range to enable filtering of 32-bit ASNs.
Figure 2 illustrates how operators use RS communities to
control the announcement of routes by a route server. Fig-
ure 2a shows an example of the NONE+INCLUDE scenario
listed in table 1. A route tagged with communities 0:6695
6695:8359 6695:8447 is advertised by the route server to
ASes 8359 and 8447 only. Figure 2b shows an example of the
ALL+EXCLUDE scenario. A route tagged with communi-
ties 6695:6695 0:5410 0:8732 is advertised to all members
except ASes 5410 and 8732. Therefore, two ASes can peer
via a route server if two requirements are satisfied: connec-
tivity and reachability. Connectivity is enabled by establish-
ing a session with the route server. Reachability is enabled
by configuring outbound filters using RS communities and
inbound AS-PATH filters.
4. LINK INFERENCE ALGORITHM
The discovery of IXP links is key to obtaining complete
AS topologies. In this section, we explore how one could dis-
cover IXP links on a regular basis, at low cost, with public or
reproducible measurements. This section presents a frame-
work for the inference of invisible IXP peering links through
public BGP data. The key idea behind our methodology is
that by obtaining both connectivity and reachability data
via IXP infrastructure, it is possible to infer the peering
links established with a route server without having to ob-
serve them in a BGP or traceroute path.
Connectivity data, namely which ASes are connected to
a given route server, can be obtained from three sources of
data: (i) looking glass (LG) servers that provide an inter-
face to route servers, (ii) RPSL AS-SETs registered in IRRs
by AS operators, and (iii) IXP websites that list connected
networks. Information obtained from LGs is the most re-
liable as it explicitly reports the status of the route server
routing table, although previous studies (and our own anal-
ysis) have found the other two sources to be accurate and
current [28, 15]. Reachability data (RS community strings
in route advertisements) can be extracted from public BGP
data sources; these include passive BGP measurements (e.g.
Route Views and RIS repositories) and active BGP queries
of available IXP LG servers.
Before we describe the link inference methodology in de-
tail we first illustrate an example in figure 3 to explain the
logic behind our algorithm. In figure 3 ASes A, B, C and
D are connected to an IXP route server operated by ASN
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Figure 3: Inferring peering links over a route server
using RS communities. The communities sent to
the route server are shown in (a) while (b) shows
the links that result. C’s routes are received by A,
but C blocks A from receiving its routes, so we do
not infer a p2p link between A and C.
6695. Each of these ASes advertises routes tagged with a
set of RS community values. According to these RS com-
munities, all ASes will receive each others’ routes except C
which is excluded by A. To infer peering links over the route
server we also need to know the import filters because an AS
may filter some routes received. However, we do not have
import filters of all RS members; we overcome this limita-
tion by making the following reciprocity assumption: If an
RS member i does not exclude another RS member j from
receiving its prefix advertisements, i will also not block the
incoming advertisements from j. Hence, we infer a p2p link
between two RS members if they have a reciprocal ALLOW
export policy. In figure 3 (b) only A and C do not have a
p2p link. In section 4.4 we validate the correctness of this
reciprocity assumption against a 230 IRR-based import and
export filters set by AMS-IX RS members.
4.1 Inference based on Active BGP Queries
Many IXPs provide public LG interfaces to their route
servers which allow the use of non-privileged BGP com-
mands to query the status of the route server routing table.
The following steps describe the basic version of our algo-
rithm for using the LG commands to infer the peering links
over a route server:
Step 1: Obtain the ASNs and IXP IP addresses of the
networks connected to the route server using the show ip
bgp command. Let ARS be the set of all connected networks
on the route server.
Step 2: For each ASN a ∈ ARS collect the set of pre-
fixes advertised to the route server using the show ip bgp
neighbor [address] routes command. Let Pa be the set
of advertised prefixes for an ASN a ∈ ARS.
Step 3: For each ASN a ∈ ARS query the prefix informa-
tion for a subset of its prefixes P ′a ∈ Pa using the show ip
bgp [prefix] command. The prefix information will give
us the set of RS community values Ca,p applied by ASN a
when it advertises a prefix p ∈ P ′a to the route server.
Step 4: From steps 1-3 we have obtained both the con-
nectivity data (ARS) and the reachability data (Ca,p), so we
can infer the peering links established via the route server.
For each ASN a ∈ ARS we construct a set Na =
T
p
Na,p
with Na,p ⊂ ARS, which contains the route server partici-
pants toward which all of its routes are advertised. We have
two cases depending on the type of RS communities used:
1. ALL + EXCLUDE : Na,p = ARS−Ep, where Ep is the
list of the route server participants excluded by the RS
communities, with Ep ⊂ ARS.
2. NONE + INCLUDE : Na,p = Ip, where I is the list
of the route server participants included by the RS
communities, with Ip ⊂ ARS.
Step 5: For every pair of ASNs (a, a′) ∈ ARS we infer a
p2p link between them if a ∈ Na′ and a
′ ∈ Na, i.e. only if
both ASes a and a′ allow each other to receive their routes.
If the IXP does not provide a LG, we can obtain RS com-
munities from third-party LGs of networks connected to the
IXP, i.e., RS members. However, these third-party LGs can-
not provide the full view of the RS communities for all the
RS members, but only for those members that allow their
routes to be advertised to the network that operates the LG.
4.2 Inference based on Passive BGP Data
In addition to active BGP querying via LG servers, our al-
gorithm also works with passive BGP collections from Route
Views and RIPE RIS archives. Using passive BGP collec-
tions offers three benefits. First, it allows us to extend our
inference of p2p links, since not all IXPs provide LG in-
terfaces to their route servers. Second, it can also reduce
the number of LG queries necessary, which we explain in
this section. Third, it allows us to infer historical peer-
ing trends, in conjunction with historical connectivity data
through archived IRR records or website archiving services
such as the Wayback Machine [13].
Although passive collections do not show the complete
route server BGP table, it is still possible to obtain some
RS community values. BGP communities are optional tran-
sitive attributes; they can be propagated by BGP speakers
in the control plane. If at least one route server partici-
pant (or one of its customers) provides a vantage point to a
Route Views or RIS route collector, it is possible to obtain
the RS communities for a large number of IXP participants,
depending on the number of RS peerings. For example, we
are able to collect the RS communities for 101 of LINX’s RS
members from AS11666 which participates in LINX RS and
contributes a BGP view to the Route Views EQIX collector.
Figure 4 extends the example from figure 3. Suppose that
AS E is a customer of AS D and contributes a BGP view to
a collector. The IXP links that involve D (D–A, D–B, D–C)
will be visible in AS paths archived by the route collector,
although links (A–B, B–C) will not be seen in AS paths ob-
served by E. However, these paths are also accompanied by
the RS communities that B, C and D have applied if RS
community values are propagated from the route server to
AS D and then to E. Since D is the AS that provides a view
of the IXP route server to the BGP collector, we will call it
the RS feeder. Even if we have only one RS feeder from an
IXP, if this feeder is densely connected we can obtain the
RS communities for a large number of RS members.
One challenge with the inference of route server peerings
using archived BGP data is to determine which AS applied
the RS communities and at which IXP. We are able to deter-
mine the IXP based either on the upper or the lower 16 bits
of the RS community values which typically encode the ASN
of the route server. For example, we infer the RS community
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Figure 4: Inference of Route Server peering links
through passive BGP measurements. Even though
we don’t observe AS paths with A–B and B–C links,
we infer they exist through the community values
attached to routes received by E.
values in figure 4 were set at DE-CIX route servers because
they contain DE-CIX’s ASN (6695). However, sometimes
there may be no RS community that encodes the ASN of
the IXP. For example, consider the RS community values
defined by MSK-IX in table 1. In the ALL+EXCLUDE sce-
nario only the ALL community encodes 8631 which is the
ASN of MSK-IX route servers. Since the ALL community
is unnecessary because it is the default behavior it may be
omitted. Instead, the RS communities may only contain an
array of EXCLUDE values of type 0:peer-asn which makes
it difficult to determine the IXP route server as we described
above. In such cases we infer the IXP by examining the ex-
cluded ASes; each of the excluded ASes may connect to route
servers at different IXPs, but often the combination of ASes
is only found at a single IXP.
After the RS communities have been extracted and the
route server has been identified, we need to pin-point the
AS that applied these communities, which we call the RS
setter. We check every AS in the path against the list of the
IXP’s participants obtained either through RPSL objects or
the IXP’s website. We distinguish the following cases:
1. If the AS path contains less than two IXP participants
we cannot pin-point the setter.
2. If the AS path contains two IXP participants, we iden-
tify as the RS setter the AS closest to the origin. For
the first route in figure 4 we know that D and A are
RS members; if AS E is not also a RS member then
we infer A is the RS setter.
3. If the AS path contains more than two IXP partici-
pants, we need to determine which two have a p2p rela-
tionship (normally only one p2p relationship should be
observed in an AS path, as explained in 2.1). For this
purpose we use the AS relationships from [32] which
have been shown to have over 99% accuracy for c2p
relationships inferred. After we find the IXP partic-
ipants with the p2p relationship, we identify the RS
setter as the AS whose position in the path is closer
to the IP prefix. For example, in figure 4, if all E, D
and A are members of the route server we check the
relationships of the links E – D, and D – A. Since E –
D is of c2p type we infer A as the RS setter.
Having identified the RS setters SRS and their community
values Cs,p we can then infer the route server peerings fol-
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Figure 5: CCDF of the number of RS members ad-
vertising a given prefix to the DE-CIX route server.
48.4% of prefixes were announced by more than one
member.
lowing steps 4 and 5 in section 4.1. When both active and
passive measurement data are available for the same IXP
route server we combine their data before executing steps 4
and 5.
4.3 Querying Cost
The cost of active measurements is expressed in terms of
the number of queries that must be issued and processed [15].
Minimizing this querying cost facilitates more frequent col-
lection. The cost c of our algorithm is given by the following
equation:
c = 1 + |ARS|+
[
a
P ′a (1)
The total number of queries depends on the number of
RS members (|ARS|) and the number of prefix information
commands issued for each prefix queried at step 3. During
our five month analysis (January - May 2013) we found the
community values applied by each RS member were remark-
ably consistent among their different prefix announcements
toward a specific route server. In fact we found less than
0.5% of cases when a RS member had prefix announcements
with different RS communities, and these differences were
only found in less than 2% of their prefixes.1 Therefore by
randomly selecting 10% of the prefixes advertised by each
RS member, with a maximum of 100 prefixes, we can obtain
a consistent view of the RS communities.
We further reduce the querying cost by carefully select-
ing which IP prefixes to query. Figure 5 shows that 48.4%
of prefixes received by the DE-CIX route server were adver-
tised by at least two RS members. By strategically querying
BGP information from an LG server for a prefix advertised
by multiple RS members, we can obtain the RS communi-
ties attached by those members with a single prefix query.
Consequently, we sort in decreasing order the prefixes in Pa
according to the number of RS members mp that advertise
each prefix to the RS, and we start querying prefix infor-
mation from the prefix with the highest mp. In the case of
the DE-CIX LG this optimization reduces the total number
of queries to 8,400, which is the maximum cost we observed
among all the route servers. Without these optimizations we
would require 18x more queries. To even further reduce the
number of LG queries, we exclude from the active queries
1Here we refer to prefix advertisements toward the same
route server. When an AS is member of more than one
IXP route servers its prefix announcements can differ sig-
nificantly across IXPs, but our algorithm is applied on each
route server separately.
the RS members for which the communities are collected
through passive BGP measurements. Thus our optimized
querying cost can be now expressed as:
c = 1 + |ARS −A
passive
RS |+
[
a
(P ′a − P
passive
a ) (2)
where ApassiveRS is the set of RS members whose RS commu-
nities can be obtained through passive measurements, and
P passivea = ∅ for each a /∈ A
passive
RS . Excluding those prefixes
from the active queries reduces the total number of queries
to 5,922. By conducting active measurement queries for dif-
ferent IXPs in parallel we can complete all measurements in
less than 17 hours even with a rate limit of 1 query per 10
seconds.
4.4 Import and Export Filters
At the beginning of this section, we stated a reciprocity
assumption according to which we infer the import filters:
if a RS member is (not) blocked by the export filter it will
also be (not) blocked by the import filter. In other words,
if an AS is willing to send traffic to a RS member it will
also be willing to accept traffic from it. To validate the
correctness of this assumption we use import and export
filter data from the members of the AMS-IX route servers.
AMS-IX uses an IRR-based filtering mechanism from which
the BGP configurations are automatically generated [1], so
both import and export filters can be obtained for the AMS-
IX members that utilize IRR filtering.
We extracted the filters of 230 AMS-IX RS members by
parsing RIPE, ARIN and RADB databases from April 2013.
For all of the AMS-IX members the import filters were at
most as restrictive as the export filters, and often more per-
missive. None of the IRR import filters blocked an AS that
was not blocked by the corresponding export filter, confirm-
ing our assumption. However, about half of the import fil-
ters blocked fewer ASes than the export filters, meaning that
many RS members are more open at receiving traffic, even
from ASes which they do not wish to send traffic. Hence,
our assumption is conservative, it does not introduce false-
positives but it will miss asymmetric peering links where
traffic flows in a single direction.
5. RESULTS
We gathered the RS members and supported RS com-
munities for 13 large European IXPs listed in table 2. We
first collected RS communities through passive BGP data to
minimize the querying load on LG servers. We accumulated
daily BGP table dumps and update messages from Route
Views and RIPE RIS repositories for 1-7 May 2013. We fil-
tered out paths that contain (1) reserved, unassigned, and
private ASNs (i.e. 23456 and 63488–131071) which should
not have appeared in BGP advertisements and (2) path cy-
cles that resulted from misconfiguration and poisoning. We
also filtered out transient AS paths to avoid inferring short-
lived links that may result from misconfigurations in setting
community values. The next step is to query the available
LGs for the RS communities of the remaining RS members.
We wrote a script to automate this (HTTP) querying of
LGs and parsing of responses. Nine of the IXPs provided
an LG interface to their route servers2; for the remaining
2France-IX’s LG does not output RS communities, so we
used Renater’s LG which has a feed from France-IX RS.
IXP LG ASes RS Pasv Active Links
AMS-IX N 574 444 296 55 49249
DE-CIX Y 483 369 113 256 54082
LINX N 457 177* 137 39 14759
MSK-IX Y 374 348 23 325 58501
PLIX Y 222 211 37 174 21911
France-IX Y 193 169 103 25 8117
LONAP N 120 109 30 65 4458
ECIX Y 102 83 33 50 2751
SPB-IX Y 89 78 0 78 2828
DTEL-IX Y 74 71 0 66 1725
TOP-IX Y 71 52 19 33 1272
STHIX N 69 42 4 23 340
BIX.BG Y 53 52 0 52 950
Table 2: Results for the inference of MLP links per
IXP. The ASes column shows the number of ASes
at each IXP, and the RS column shows how many
of these ASes are connected to the route server;
LINX is marked with an asterisk because it does
not provide a list of RS members either from its
website or an AS-SET. We could only obtain partial
data by searching the IRR records of LINX’s mem-
bers for AS8714, the ASN of LINX’s route server.
The pasv column shows the number of RS members
whose community strings we obtain from passive
BGP data, and the active column shows the number
of RS members whose community strings we obtain
via querying LGs, either directly from the IXP’s LG
(Y in the LG column) or from the LG of a member of
that IXP. Finally, the links column shows the num-
ber of MLP links inferred for each IXP.
IXPs we use 11 LGs provided by their RS members. We
can only obtain partial connectivity using only passive BGP
data and third-party LGs to collect an IXP’s RS communi-
ties; in the future we plan to integrate more data sources to
expand our view of these IXPs. By combining connectivity
information and the RS communities collected by passive
and active measurements, we inferred 206,667 multilateral
peering links between 1,363 different ASNs. The summa-
tion of links in table 2 is larger than 206,667 because 11,821
of the inferred links appear between ASes that co-locate in
multiple IXPs. AMS-IX and DE-CIX have the largest link
overlap with 7,502 common route server peerings, which is
expected given that 123 of the ASes in our study are con-
nected in both IXPs. However, we were only able to collect
community data for a part of the AMS-IX and LINX mem-
bers and therefore the actual link overlap may be larger.
Figure 6 compares the visibility of the MLP links in our
dataset against topological data obtained from passive (BGP
AS paths) and active (AS paths inferred from traceroute [2,
3]) measurements during the same period. We ordered the
RS members by their inferred MLP links, so the line breaks
correspond to clustering of IXPs; that is, the BGP-based
visibility of each IXP is relatively consistent for all mem-
bers of that IXP. In the Route Views and RIPE RIS data
there were 58,952 visible peering links out of 153,837 total
AS links. Only 24,511 (11.9%) of the p2p links are com-
mon between our dataset and the public BGP view. Hence,
our measurements reveal 209% more peering links, and 18%
more AS links than the public BGP view. The inferred links
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Figure 6: Comparison of the number of MLP links
found through our algorithm against passive BGP
data (Route Views, RIPE RIS, PCH) and active
traceroute data (Ark, DIMES). The inferred MLP
links have little overlap with links observed from
current active and passive data sources.
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Figure 7: For each p2p link inferred from RS com-
munities, the number of customers of the ASes in-
volved. We plot separate lines representing smallest
and largest degrees involved in each peering link.
55.6% of links involve one stub, 12.4% are between
two stubs, and 58.1% involve ASes with fewer than
10 customers.
have very little overlap with the links visible to the existing
publicly available traceroute topology data: we found only
3,927 links that also appeared in Ark-based and DIMES-
based (traceroute-inferred) AS links for the same period [2,
3]. This minimal overlap can be explained by the fact that
both Ark and DIMES do not infer links across IXP Route
Servers, but report them as links between the RS members
and the Route Servers.
To further explore the low visibility of these links in BGP
and traceroute-derived AS paths, we examined the customer
degrees of the ASes we infer established a p2p link via a
route server. The customer degree expresses the number of
customers to which an AS provides transit. The customer
degree is not affected by the number of invisible links which
are almost exclusively p2p links (see section 2.3). Figure 7
shows the degree distributions for the AS with the smallest
degree on the link and for the AS with the largest degree. In
contrast to what is observable in public BGP data, 12.4% of
Looking Glasses (ASes)
All paths
 0.86
 0.88
 0.9
 0.92
 0.94
 0.96
 0.98
 1
34
86
7
34
86
3
13
24
9
84
00
25
07
4
12
77
9
12
57
3
28
92
9
12
98
9
30
92
5
88
39
12
30
1
12
85
9
32
67
12
61
5
28
54
29
60
8
24
48
2
29
01
4
90
70
16
09
7
88
79
69
39
86
41
84
92
42
97
9
82
46
42
45
6
86
48
35
54
8
87
67
29
07
6
20
63
2
16
07
3
83
59
39
79
2
35
29
7
83
04
28
71
7
33
27
34
30
8
12
31
6
12
90
2
21
23
0
86
64
54
67
28
87
0
67
68
49
30
0
50
76
3
28
54
84
26
31
32
3
20
55
5
48
55
9
44
58
3
28
85
5
44
14
1
32
55 55
3
43
78
2
12
88
3
84
22
39
86
9
87
32
90
44
21
01
1
85
54
55
80
20
96
0
Best path
Figure 8: The fraction of successfully validatedMLP links per AS, classified by the LG type used for validation.
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only the best path. LGs that display only the best path may result in lower successful validation ratio when
less preferred links are hidden.
IXP Links Validated Links Confirmed
DE-CIX 6250 11.6% 6152 98.4%
AMS-IX 6190 12.6% 6134 99.1%
MSK-IX 4171 7.1% 4122 98.8%
LINX 3597 24.4% 3492 97.1%
PLIX 2565 11.7% 2515 98.1%
France-IX 1162 14.3% 1126 96.9%
DTEL-IX 732 42.4% 726 99.1%
ECIX 553 20.1% 548 99.1%
LONAP 460 10.3% 455 98.9%
SPB-IX 425 15.0% 422 99.3%
TOP-IX 288 22.6% 288 100%
STHIX 77 22.6% 76 98.7%
Table 3: Validation of the inferred MLP links per
IXP. We validate between 7.1% and 42.4% of the
links inferred per IXP, and we confirm between
96.9% to 100% of the links tested.
the p2p links in our MLP-inferred dataset are between two
stub ASes at the edge of the network. Because these links
occur at the edge they are visible in a path only from the
ASes involved; unsurprisingly only 1.4% of these links are
present in BGP AS paths at Route Views and RIPE RIS.
Reinforcing the dense peering at the edge which is enabled
by IXPs, 55.6% of all 206K links involve a stub, and 58.1%
of the links involve ASes with at most 10 customers.
5.1 Validation of Link Inference Algorithm
To validate the correctness of our link inference framework
we test the agreement of the inferred links against connectiv-
ity information extracted from other public LG servers. By
querying the PeeringDB database we collected the addresses
of 70 LGs that are relevant to the inferred links, meaning
the LG offers an interface to the collectors of an RS mem-
ber or one of its customers. For every inferred link relevant
to a particular LG, we try to confirm its existence by ex-
amining the AS paths returned from the command show ip
bgp [prefix]. We use up to six different prefixes to ensure
that path diversity due to traffic engineering policies will
not cause our validation to miss existing links. We select
the prefixes to be as geographically distant from each other
as possible, based on Maxmind’s geolocation database [5].
We repeated our validation at two different time periods
to ensure that the correctness of our algorithm is stable over
time. In May 2013 we tested 18,100 links and we successfully
confirmed the existence of 98% of those links. In October
2013 we tested 14,513 links and we were able to confirm
98.9% of them. In total we tested 26,392 different RS peer-
ings, and we succeeded in confirming the existence of 98.4%
of them. As shown in table 3 the validation results are con-
sistently above 97% for all of the IXPs under study. In the
intervening period between link inference and link validation
some RS members were disconnected from the route servers
or became idle. These cases were filtered out from the Oc-
tober 2013 results explaining the higher validation rate.
Observing a link in the BGP paths of an LG’s output
confirms the existence of this link, but the reverse does not
necessarily hold (not observing a link does not necessarily
mean that it does not exist). A path can be hidden from
a LG if another path with higher local preference or lower
hop count is available, and the LG displays only the active
(best) path and not all the available paths. As a result the
existence of links that are part of less preferred paths cannot
be confirmed by querying LGs that only show active paths.
Typically, paths learned from customers are assigned with
higher local preference and may hide paths learned from
peers. We also found that 14 ASes (out of the 70 used for
validation) assigned a higher local preference value to bi-
lateral peers than route server peers. Moreover, in 3 cases
the ASN of the route server was not removed from the path
making the path appear artificially longer. In all the Octo-
ber 2013 cases where a link failed validation a more preferred
path existed. Figure 8 compares the validation results be-
tween the looking glass that display all the available paths
against the looking glasses that display only the active path.
We can see that LGs that only show the active paths restrict
our validation effort.
5.2 Peering Policies of RS Members
As shown in table 2, on average 73% of an IXP’s mem-
bers chose to participate in MLP via an available route
server. To explain this high participation rate, we collect
self-reported peering policy information of IXP members
from PeeringDB [9] or on the IXPs’ websites where the in-
formation is available, e.g., PLIX. We were able to collect
policy data for 904 out of the 1,667 IXP members, 72% of
which reported an open peering policy, 24% reported a se-
lective peering policy, and 4% claimed a restrictive peering
policy.
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Figure 9: Participation in route servers compared to the self-reported peering policy. Most participants have
an open peering policy and use the route servers. Route server participation is common among selective
ASes, and rare with restrictive ASes.
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Figure 10: Number of IXPs an AS is connected
to against route server participation at those IXPs.
55.8% of ASes in our set are at a single IXP and use
its route server. 13.4% of ASes in our set do not use
any route server at any of these IXPs (bottom row).
Figure 9 shows for each of the three self-reported peering
policies of IXP members, the distribution of their partici-
pation in route servers at 11 IXPs (or only 8 IXPs that in-
volved participants with restrictive peering policies). 92% of
the ASes with open peering policies are connected to at least
one route server, consistent with their self-reported interest
in peering. Interestingly, 75% of the ASes with selective
policy and 43% of the ASs with restrictive policy are also
connected to at least one route server. These ASes decide
to connect to a route server depending not only on their
peering policy but also on their business strategy at a given
IXP location and their desired relationships with that IXP’s
candidate peers.
Figure 10 compares the number of route servers where
an AS is connected against the total number of the IXPs
where the same AS is present. Most (55.8%) ASes in our
set are at a single IXP and use its route server. 7.9% of the
ASes with presence at multiple IXPs do not have consistent
RS participation. For instance, AS9002, a large Ukrainian
ISP with a selective peering policy, opts out of connecting
to the route servers of Eastern-European IXPs (DTEL-IX
and MSK-IX) where many of its customers co-locate, but
appears to have an open peering policy in the route servers
of Western-European IXPs (DE-CIX and AMS-IX). This
suggests peering policies often can have local scope.
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Figure 11: Fraction of RS members allowed to re-
ceive prefix announcements from an AS via the RS
as a function of that AS’s self-reported peering pol-
icy in PeeringDB. Nearly all ASes allow either (1)
nearly all, or (2) only a small fraction of RS members
to receive their routes; the use of RS communities
does not scale well for implementing finer-grained
filtering. Dots are scattered within each bin to al-
low visibility.
5.3 Route Filtering Patterns of RS Members
Export filters determine the set of RS members with which
another RS member intends to peer. Figure 11 shows that
there is a binary pattern for most ASes: either very few ASes
receive routes, or the vast majority do. Specifically, almost
all RS members block fewer than 10% or allow fewer than
10% of other RS participants from receiving their paths.
This pattern is congruent with the nature of the most com-
mon RS community filters (ALL + EXCLUDE and NONE
+ INCLUDE); the use of these RS communities does not
scale well for implementing finer-grained filtering over route
servers, especially for IXPs with hundreds of members.
While the fraction of ASes that use an IXP route server is
smaller for ASes that self-report their routing policies as se-
lective and restrictive than for those self-reporting as open
(figure 9), it is still the case that most ASes using route
servers have an open peering policy. Also, a network’s ob-
servable MLP behavior is not always consistent with its re-
ported peering policy. Indeed, 69.2% of ASes self-reporting
as restrictive and connecting to route servers are also open
in establishing RS peerings, though perhaps in only certain
regions. A more meaningful classification of RS participants’
policies relies on observing their export filters, rather than
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Figure 12: Density of peering links per RS member
per IXP. For each member at each IXP, we plot
the fraction of links the member established that
it could have possibly formed using the IXP. The
red crosses show the mean density of RS peering
observed at each IXP. Dots are scattered within each
IXP for visibility.
the peering policy they self-report in PeeringDB. Studying
individual IXPs reveals region-specific (differences in) peer-
ing policies. For example, AS12779, an Italian ISP, allowed
only 3 RS members of TOP-IX (an IXP in Italy) to receive
its prefixes, but blocked only 5 RS members in DEC-IX (an
IXP in Germany).
5.4 Peering Density
Peering density can be expressed as the fraction of peer-
ing links that a RS member has established over the num-
ber of all possible peering links they could establish via the
RS. Figure 12 plots this peering density metric for mem-
bers of the route servers for which we have full connectivity
data through the corresponding LG interfaces.3 The density
of RS peering links is between 80%-95%, depending on the
number of RS members with open peering policies. Previ-
ous work has found the overall peering density of European
IXPs to be around 70%, including multilateral and bilat-
eral agreements [15, 14, 17], suggesting that the density of
RS-based peering environments is higher than the density of
bilateral peering environments.
5.5 Repellers
RS members that are blocked by the EXCLUDE com-
munities can be described as repellers by the ASes that set
those community values. Of the 1,363 RS members in all
the IXPs, 570 are blocked by at least one AS. Figure 13
shows the number of times an AS is blocked compared to
the geographic scope of its operations. Although it may
seem surprising that global networks are the top repellers
of routes by other ASes, these networks are connected to
multiple IXPs and there is a significantly larger number of
potential RS members they may repel. Of the 1,795 appli-
cations of EXCLUDE RS communities, only 12% are set by
a provider to block a customer that co-locates in the same
route server. To explore the rest of the exclusions, we cal-
culate the customer cones for each RS member using the
3DTEL-IX is excluded because its LG server restricts queries
for 5 RS members who do not wish to disclose their connec-
tivity.
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Figure 13: The distribution of blocking frequency
using exclude community values, by geographic
scope. ASes with an N/A geographic scope did
not register their scope in PeeringDB. Google’s AS
(15169) is blocked 82 times by 75 different ASes that
have another peering with Google that they prefer.
algorithm in [32]. The customer cone includes the set of
ASes in the downstream path of a provider. We find that
77% of the EXCLUDE community values are used to block
an AS that is part of the customer cone. Interestingly the
most widely blocked network is AS15169 (Google), which is
blocked 82 times by 75 different ASes. This filtering behav-
ior is counter-intuitive for networks characterized by open
peering, as AS15169 is an attractive peering partner due to
the large volume of traffic that it carries. But in these cases,
the AS that blocks AS15169 has a private peering with it
in the same IXP or another PoP and prefers the use of the
direct peering over the multilateral peering, which we con-
firmed through the available looking glasses and the IRR
records of the RS members. The same behavior is also ob-
served for other large content providers like AS20940 (Aka-
mai), which is blocked 14 times. Hence, the repulsiveness
of an RS member is relative to the route server and not
necessarily a global characteristic.
5.6 Hybrid Relationships
We observed that 1,230 of the RS links visible in passive
BGP data are inferred as provider-customer by CAIDA’s
relationship inference algorithm [32]. We attempted to clar-
ify whether these relationships are indeed hybrid p2p/p2c
relationships, if they have been mistakenly inferred p2c, or
if they are actual transit relationships over IXPs which are
known to exist although IXP operators discourage such rela-
tionships. We collected 422 relationship-tagging and ingress-
point tagging BGP community values, defined by 85 dif-
ferent ASes that are involved in 440 hybrid relationships.
Combining the two community types, we can learn the re-
lationship type at the different points-of-presence. We were
able to verify 202 of these relationships as location-specific
hybrid relationships. However, it is difficult to generalize
these findings for all the links given the lack of additional
data.
5.7 The Full Picture
Our results reveal that the incompleteness problem is much
larger than previously believed. Not only the publicly avail-
able data miss the majority of peering links but also past
works on link discovery underestimated the total number
of peering links (e.g. [15, 21]). To put into perspective the
topology incompleteness problem and the contribution of
our work, in this section we attempt to estimate the num-
ber of IXP peerings globally.
Past works have found that the peering density of Eu-
ropeans IXPs ranges between 60% – 70% [14, 18]. These
findings are supported by data obtained through public IXP
peering matrices [8, 7, 11]. According to Cardona et al. [18]
the peering density depends heavily on the pricing model.
Flat-fee pricing encourages the establishment of more peer-
ings and results in peering density close to 70%, while usage-
based pricing leads to peering density close to 60%. The
availability of route servers is a second important factor that
leads to increased peering density by enabling multilateral
peering [41, 20]. We utilize these findings to calculate the
number of peering links within large European IXPs. For
the 37 largest European IXPs with at least 50 members, we
collected data from peering registries [4, 9] and individual
IXP websites on the members, the pricing model, and the
availability of route servers. For IXPs with a flat-fee pricing
and available route servers we assume a peering density of
70%, for IXPs with usage-based pricing and available route
servers we assume a peering density of 60%, while for IXPs
with no route servers we assume a peering density of 50%.
Based on these assumptions we estimate the number of Eu-
ropean IXP peerings to 558,291. In the case of the highest
possible link overlap among those IXPs we estimate 399,732
unique AS peering links.
To expand our estimation we gathered data for all the
IXPs globally with at least 50 members. In total we com-
piled data for 61 IXPs (37 in Europe, 14 in North America,
11 in Asia/Pacific, 1 in Latin America, and 1 in Africa), in
which 8,577 different ASes are connected. We maintain the
same assumptions on peering density except for the North
American IXPs that have a primarily for-profit business
model that results in lower peering density [15, 20]. Assum-
ing a peering density of 40% for North American IXPs we
estimate the global number of IXP peering links to 686,104,
and the number of unique AS peering links to 510,870. For
a more conservative estimation we assume that no IXP has
peering density over 60%; in this case the global number of
IXP peerings would be 596,011, while the total number of
unique AS peerings would be 422,423.
5.8 Limitations of our methodology
Despite the substantial number of invisible links discov-
ered, a large fraction of the AS topology is still missing.
First, our methodology is limited to the discovery of mul-
tilateral peering agreements, and does not capture bilateral
peering links. MLP is more prevalent in the European In-
ternet, where we focused this work. IXPs in North America
support mostly bilateral peerings, although there are notable
exceptions such as Equinix, Any2 and Telx. Moreover, our
algorithm requires that a route server utilize BGP commu-
nities to control path advertisements, and that these com-
munities are not filtered out. Although this configuration is
popular, alternative techniques exist. For example, the Vi-
enna Internet Exchange (VIX) and the Hong Kong Internet
Exchange (HKIX) provide a web portal to configure export
filters, while the Netnod route servers strip out all commu-
nity values before propagating paths to its RS members.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Using new techniques to mine IXP route server data with
a mapping of BGP community values, we inferred 206K
p2p links from 13 large European IXPs, four times more
p2p links than are directly observable in public BGP data.
Our approach uses only existing BGP data sources, and re-
quires only few active queries of LG servers, facilitating re-
producibility of our results.
As discussed in section 2.3, a variety of challenges in sus-
tainable measurement instrumentation, the nature of the
Internet’s routing architecture, and the complexity of the
ecosystem render topology incompleteness an inherent part
of Internet science. Since no single source of topological data
can provide a complete topology, advancing our understand-
ing of Internet topology will require extracting all insights
we can from all data sources available, including combin-
ing data sources where possible and appropriate. Although
we implement and validate a new capability to analyze the
dense establishment of peering at IXPs, we emphasize that
a significant open question relates to how much traffic such
IXP peering links carry, which would be an enlightening
measure of their relative importance in the global topology.
In the future we plan to apply our methods to additional
IXPs and BGP data sources. We will also investigate how
our algorithm can reduce the cost of traceroute measure-
ments that target the discovery of IXP peerings, to en-
able sustainable operational measurement infrastructure us-
ing such methods.
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